Abstract. In this paper we investigate non-normal modal systems in the vicinity of the Lewis system S1. It might be claimed that Lewis's modal systems (S1, S2, S3, S4 and S5) are the starting point of modern modal logics. However our interests in the Lewis systems and their relatives are not (merely) historical. They possess certain syntactical features and their frames certain structural properties that are of interest to us. Our starting point is not S1, but a weaker logic S1 0 (S1 without the schema [T]). We extend it to S1 0 D, which can be considered as a deontic counterpart of the alethic S1. We then prove the soundness and completeness of these systems within a prenormal idiom. We offer some concluding philosophical remarks on the interpretation of our deontic logic.
Introduction
It is an unsettled question why we should study deontic logics. Some no doubt study them seeking illumination of the structure of moral reasoning, though such light as they shed shifts toward the infrared. Some study them simply as they would study any modal logic, purely for the technical interest. For such people the label "deontic" applies simply in virtue of the absence of the principle [T] . Our shared view is that in the matter of the relationship between deontic logic and moral discourse, these are early days, too early to settle the question. But there is intrinsic technical interest in better understanding the relationship between alethic and deontic systems, and such an improved understanding ought to influence any assignment to deontic logic of a broader conceptual role. One or two illustrations will preview later points. We obtain the so-called Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) by replacing [T] with [D] in the system KT of Kripke's classic paper. The corresponding difference between alethic accessibility and deontic accessibility is that alethic accessibility is reflexive; deontic accessibility serial. But as we insist in introductory logic courses, we can existentially generalize on either occurrence of x in Rxx. Certainly seriality (∃yRxy) is one generalization, but so is converse seriality (∃yRyx). Why, if we are merely looking for a weakening of reflexivity should we consider the one but not the other? On its deontic reading the former yields [D] , p → ¬ ¬p, which seems to say that there are no moral conflicts; the second yields the rule of denecessitation ( α =⇒ α), which seems to say that the only logically obligatory acts are theorems.
A second illustration concerns the very starting point of modal logics. The system K is nowadays regarded as the base Kripkean system since it is the system corresponding to the class of all relational frames. But it also corresponds post-facto to an interpretive intuition: that the set of necessities constitutes a theory, that is, a deductively closed set. To that system, we add either an alethic principle or a deontic one depending upon whether we seek an alethic or a deontic system. But that intuition is a happy consequence of a convenient semantic idiom, rather than a desideratum that compels the idiom. An algebraically inspired intuition might have suggested to some that
[RM] α → β α → β ought to form the base system. Such a starting point for alethic modal logic would have the happy consequence that and ♦ have precisely the same logic. So this would yield a genuinely modal system, rather than a system of necessity. For systems specifically of necessity or specifically of possibility, different extensions would be required. But this system is already deontic in character, and, moreover, a system in which obligation and permissibility have the same logic. Now one could find grounds for rejecting all of the principles of either system, except perhaps for the consistency principle [Con] . One might reject K because it permits no distinction between [Con] and [D] . One could reject [RM] as too strong, and one could reject [N] on the grounds that all obligations ought to be shirkable. Of course this last intuition is not adequately satisfied by the elimination of [N] . We would require a positive principle that states as much, a principle such as
The point of these remarks is to justify the study of deontic logics in the region of S1. A first step toward doing so is to establish a base from which to explore generalizations of these systems and enlargements of the class of model-structures. If we needed an excuse for such explorations, they need not be that the system itself has plausible deontic interpretations. By such a standard, there would be no justification for studying SDL, all of whose basic principles are deontically implausible. However S1 is a system in which an obvious alternative to the standard weakening of reflexivity is natural. And it is a system for which an intriguing re-interpretation of nonnormality presents itself, not perhaps for immediate deontic liquidity, but for experimental modification. This is the point at which to end our excuse-making. All such explorations are experimental. It is the notion that the study of deontic logics has got beyond the stage of primary research that is suspect, and probably illusory.
Lewis Systems and their Relatives
Lemmon in [6] provides alternative axiomatizations of the Lewis systems S1-S4 with a propositional logic basis. Before introducing Lemmon's axiomatizations, we list the axioms that we need in the following:
The following rules of inference are also required:
Notes:
• γ[α/β] is the wff resulting from replacing some (possibly zero) occurrence of α in γ with an occurrence of β.
• "RN" stands for the rule of necessitation, "RdN" for the rule of denecessitation, "RM" for the rule of monotonicity, "RE" for the rule of extensionality, "Eq" for equivalents, "RRE" ("RRSE", "RRTE") for the rule of replacement of (strict, tautologous) equivalents, "MP" for modus ponens, the prefix "S" for strict (it means that the rule is the strict version of the named rule), and the suffixes "Ax" and "PL" for axioms and propositional logic (it means that the named rule is restricted to axioms or tautologies). Note that when listed as part of a system, tautologies are considered as axioms of the system in question.
In the following we adopt the Chellas and Segerberg axiomatization of S1 0 in [1] with some modifications.
1
Definition 2.2. The systems S1 0 , S1 0 D, and S1 0 T are as follows:
By "1 0 system", we mean a system that includes PL and provides [RN Ax ], [RdN], [ S Eq], and [X] . Thus S1 0 is the smallest 1 0 system. (Note that S1 0 T is just S1.)
Prenormal Idiom
Cresswell in [2, 3] provides a semantic analysis for S1. The models he uses combine the Kripkean style binary relational models with the neighbourhood models introduced by Montague and Scott. In the next two sections, we extend his method to analyze S1 0 and its extension S1 0 D. However we do this within a "prenormal idiom" based on a recent recast and generalization of Cresswell's semantics for S1 by Chellas and Segerberg ( [1] ). (Note: Chellas and Segerberg develop the semantics to study a class of logics which they call "prenormal logics"; hence we call their semantics "prenormal idiom" although the name is not used by them.) 1 Chellas and Segerberg give two axiomatizations of S1 0 , both of which are somewhat different from the one we provide here. For example, their first axiomatization, using the symbols of this paper, is PL, [ (1) U (the universe of the frame) is a non-empty set of points.
(2) N (the set of normal points) and Q (the set of non-normal or queer points) are disjoint subsets of U that exhaust it (i.e., N ∩ Q = ∅ and
) is a neighbourhood function subject to the condition that for every x ∈ Q, U ∈ S(x).
is a function which maps each atom (of the propositional modal language) to a set of points of U .
Definition 3.3. The prenormal idiom P is the ordered triple L, C, T where L is the propositional modal language, C is the class of all prenormal frames, and T (truth in the idiom) is defined recursively on the set of wffs in accordance with the following truth conditions for α (the truth conditions for atoms and propositional connectives are as usual):
x α}, the truth set of α in M.) In this paper, we are interested in a restricted sense of validity: a formula is valid (in our restricted sense) on a prenormal frame iff it is true at every normal point in every model on that frame. Following Chellas and Segerberg in [1] , we call validity relativized to normal points "Lewisvalidity". Formally, Definition 3.4. Let F = U, N, Q, R, S be a prenormal frame. Then a wff α is said to be Lewis-valid on F (F |= Lew α) iff for every model M on F and x ∈ N , |= M x α. Definition 3.5. Let D be a class of prenormal frames. Then a wff α is said to be Lewis-valid on D(D |= Lew α) iff for every F ∈ D, F |= Lew α.
The notions of soundness, completeness, and determination of a system with respect to a class of prenormal frames can be defined in terms of Lewisvalidity. As in the case of validity, we label them "Lewis-soundness", "Lewiscompleteness", and "Lewis-determination".
A Semantics for S1 0
In this section, we show that the system S1 0 is Lewis-determined with respect to a certain class of prenormal frames (which we call "1 0 frames"). Definition 4.1. A 1 0 frame is a prenormal frame F = U, N, Q, R, S which satisfies the following conditions: 
Thus for any x ∈ Q, it is not the case that both p → q M ∈ S(x) and q → r M ∈ S(x) (by condition (3) in Definition 4.1). Thus [X] is trivially true at every queer point.
For [RN Ax ], note that any axiom α (a tautology or [X] ) is true at every point, normal or queer, in any model on any 1 0 frame. Thus its necessitation α is true at every normal point in any such model. In other words,
For [RdN] , assume that C 1 0 |= Lew α, i.e., α is true at every normal point in any model on any 1 0 frame. Then C 1 0 |= Lew α since every normal point in any such model has a normal predecessor (by condition (2) of Definition 4.1).
For [ S Eq], assume that
. Let x be a point (normal or queer) in any model M on any 1 0 frame. From the assumption, (α ↔ β) is true at every normal point, and, by condition (2) of Definition 4.1, x has a normal predecessor. Thus |= M x α ↔ β. Then the following hold:
From the above we can conclude that
In proving the completeness of 1 0 systems, we adopt the Henkin style of completeness proof. The strategy is as follows: for any 1 0 system L, we define a prenormal frame and model called the L-canonical frame and Lcanonical model (the set of normal points of the frame and model is the set of all the maximal L-consistent sets of wffs), and show that (A) a wff is true at a point in the canonical model iff it is a member of that point (the fundamental theorem for 1 0 systems), and (B) the canonical frame is in a class C of prenormal frames. From the above results we can argue that any non-L-theorem is Lewis-invalid in class C (since any such wff is absent from some normal point of the L-canonical model), and so any wff Lewis-valid in C is an L-theorem. To demonstrate (A) and (B), we initially derive several theorems and rules of inference for a 1 0 system, and demonstrate several general propositions about 1 0 canonical frames. 
. But the wffs ( → p) and p are tautologous equivalents, and so are ( → q) and q. Thus by [RRTE] ,
To Lemma 4.5. A 1 0 system has the following theorem and rule:
For (2) . Assume that ♦α → β. By Lemma 4.6. A 1 0 system has the following theorem:
We are now in a position to prove the fundamental theorem for 1 0 systems (after defining the canonical frames and models for such systems). However, to facilitate the presentation of the proofs of the fundamental theorem and subsequent completeness theorems, we will, after defining the canonical frames and models for 1 0 systems, demonstrate two more lemmas about their canonical frames.
Definition 4.7. Let L be a 1 0 system. Then the canonical frame for L is the prenormal frame
x is a maximal PL-consistent set of wffs satisfying both of the following conditions:
We note that F L as defined above is indeed a prenormal frame since N L and Q L are disjoint ( , being a theorem of L, is in every normal point but it is not in any queer point.)
Proof. Let x be a normal point. Assume that α / ∈ x. It is sufficient to show that the set Σ = (x) ∪ {¬α} has an extension in N L or Q L . For reductio assume neither. That is, assume that (1) Σ is not L-consistent and (2) if y is a maximal PL-consistent extension of Σ, then y contains . (For the second point, note that if y is a maximal PL-consistent extension of Σ, then the set {¬ α|α ∈ y} is already L-consistent since it is a subset of x.) From (1) and (2) above, we can infer the following:
Then by (i) and Lemma 4.4(4), L (δ → α). Then by [K], L δ → α and so δ → α ∈ x (note that every L-theorem is in x). However δ ∈ x since β 1 , . . . , β n , γ 1 , . . . , γ m ∈ x and L provides [C] . Thus by the deductive closure of maximal L-consistent sets, α ∈ x. But this is contrary to the initial assumption that α / ∈ x. Thus by reductio, (x) ∪ {¬α} has an extension in N L or Q L .
Lemma 4.10. Let L be a 1 0 system. Then for any wffs α and β,
Proof. Let α and β be arbitrary wffs. Assume that |α| L = |β| L , i.e., for any
Then by Lemma 4.9, there exists a y ∈ U L such that R L x y and α ↔ β / ∈ y. But this is contrary to what can be inferred from the initial assumption. Thus, by reductio, L α = β.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of α. The only interesting case is the modal one. Assume that for every
For x ∈ N L . Assume, for contraposition, that α / ∈ x. Then by Lemma 4.9, there exists a y ∈ U L such that R L xy and α / ∈ y, i.e.,
By Lemma 4.10, we can infer that L α = β, and by [ S Eq], L α = β. Then the wff α = β is in every normal point. Moreover it is evident that every queer point (say x ) has a normal predecessor (since the set {¬ α|α / ∈ x } is L-consistent and so has an extension y in N L such that (y) ⊆ x ). Thus α ↔ β is in every queer point. Thus α is in x since β is.
Theorem 4.12. The canonical frame for the system S1 0 is in the class C 1 0 of frames.
Proof. Let F S1 0 = U S1 0 , N S1 0 , Q S1 0 , R S1 0 , S S1 0 be the canonical frame for S1 0 . We show that it is a 1 0 frame, that is, it satisfies the conditions stipulated in Definition 4.1. Clearly N S1 0 is non-empty since S1 0 is consistent. The more interesting conditions are the requirements that (1) every point in U S1 0 has a normal predecessor and that (2) no two neighbourhoods of a queer point "cover" the universe.
For (1) . If x ∈ Q S1 0 , it is evident that it has a normal predecessor since the set {¬ α|α / ∈ x} is S1 0 -consistent (as we have already argued when proving Theorem 4.11). It remains to show that the same holds for every normal point. Thus let x ∈ N S1 0 be arbitrary. Assume, for reductio, that the set {¬ α|α / ∈ x} is not S1 0 -consistent. Then, for some β 1 , . . . , β n / ∈ x:
Then (¬β 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬β n−1 ) → β n ∈ x. But ¬β 1 , . . . , ¬β n−1 ∈ x. Then β n ∈ x, which is absurd since β n / ∈ x. Thus, by reductio, the set {¬ α|α / ∈ x} is S1 0 -consistent, whence we can argue that x has a normal predecessor.
For (2) . Let x be a queer point, a and b subsets of U S1 0 . Assume that a, b ∈ S S1 0 (x). Further assume for reductio that a∪b = U S1 0 . Then for some wffs α, β ∈ x, a = |α| S1 0 and b = |β| S1 0 . It is evident that |α → β| S1 0 ⊆ |β| S1 0 (since |α| S1 0 ∪ |β| S1 0 = U S1 0 ), and so |α → β| S1 0 = |β| S1 0 . Then:
by Lemma 4.10
Then β → (α → β) ∈ x (since every queer point has a normal predecessor). Then (α → β) ∈ x (since β ∈ x). But α ∧ (α → β) → ∈ x (by Lemma 4.6 and x having a normal predecessor). Since α, (α → β) ∈ x, we have ∈ x, which is absurd. Thus by reductio a ∪ b = U S1 0 .
Theorem 4.13. The system S1 0 is Lewis-complete with respect to the class C 1 0 of frames.
Proof. The Lewis-completeness of the system S1 0 with respect to the class C 1 0 of frames follows directly from the Fundamental Theorem for S1 0 systems and the theorem that the canonical frame for S1 0 is in the class C 1 0 of frames (Theorems 4.11 and 4.12 respectively).
Theorem 4.14. The system S1 0 is Lewis-determined by the class C 1 0 of frames.
Proof. Since S1 0 is both Lewis-sound and Lewis-complete with respect to the class C 1 0 of frames, it is Lewis-determined by the class C 1 0 of frames. Proof. Let F S1 0 D = U S1 0 D , N S1 0 D , Q S1 0 D , R S1 0 D , S S1 0 D be the canonical frame for S1 0 D. It suffices to show that R S1 0 D is serial. Let x ∈ N S1 0 D be arbitrary. We show that the set (x) of wffs has an extension either in N S1 0 D or Q S1 0 D . For reductio, assume neither. That is to say, assume that (1) (x) is not S1 0 D-consistent and (2) If y is a maximal PL-consistent extension of (x), then it contains . (Note that the set {¬ α|α / ∈ y} is already S1 0 D-consistent since it is included in x.) From the above, we can infer the following:
Then by (i) and Lemma 4.4(4),
. . , α n−1 , β 1 , . . . , β m ∈ x, and so is [C] .) Thus by the deductive closure of maximal S1 0 D-consistent sets, ¬α n is in x. But this is absurd, since α n ∈ (x), i.e., α n ∈ x and so ¬ ¬α n ∈ x (for [D] is a theorem of S1 0 D and it is in x). Thus, by reductio, (x) has an extension in N S1 0 D or Q S1 0 D , whence we can conclude that x has a successor in U S1 0 D . Theorem 5.4. The system S1 0 D is Lewis-complete with respect to the class C 1 0 D of frames.
Proof. The Lewis-completeness of the system S1 0 D with respect to the class C 1 0 D of frames follows directly from the Fundamental Theorem for S1 0 system and the theorem that the canonical frame for S1 0 D is in the class C 1 0 D of frames. (Theorems 4.11 and 5.3 respectively).
Theorem 5.5. The system S1 0 D is Lewis-determined by the class C 1 0 D of frames.
Proof. Since S1 0 D is both Lewis-sound and Lewis-complete with respect to the class C 1 0 D of frames, it is Lewis-determined by the class C 1 0 D of frames.
Philosophical Remarks: From Alethic to Deontic Systems
If we were to drop the condition that R be reflexive, this would be equivalent to abandoning the modal axiom A ⊃ We do not give a detailed interpretation of the systems KD, RD and S1 0 D here, but rather comment on a few points on their suitableness as a minimal deontic logic (the smallest logic that would preserve our intuitions about obligation). One of the (many) objections to the normal system KD as a deontic logic is its use of the rule of necessitation [RN] α =⇒ α. What the rule effectively says (in deontic terms) is that it is a logical law that any law of logic is obligatory. But this seems to be contrary to our intuition that logic by itself cannot give rise to obligations, and that only obligations can give rise to obligations. It is because of this objection that we consider non-normal logics RD and S1 0 D rather than the normal KD as plausible candidates for the minimal deontic logic. Neither RD nor S1 0 D provides the rule [RN] (although the latter system has [RN Ax ], which is a weakened version of [RN] ). Semantically, they avoid the rule [RN] by the presence of queer worlds at which there are no obligations whatsoever (in non-normal frames) or no tautologous obligations (in prenormal frames). Whether this is a satisfactory way to drop the rule [RN] is controversial, for it may be objected that there are still logical obligations or tautologous obligations at normal worlds. However we will pursue this point no further here, for there is another objection to proposing RD and S1 0 D as candidates for the minimal deontic logic.
An objection to RD and S1 0 D (and also KD) as being the minimal deontic logic is related to their commitment to non-conflicting obligations (in virtue of [D] ). Whether there are genuinely conflicting obligations or not will not be adjudicated here. However if our project is to find the minimal deontic logic, the smallest logic that would preserve our intuitions about obligation, then RD and S1 0 D do not qualify as the minimal deontic logic (at least not without controversy). If so, we may ask whether [D] could be replaced by a weaker and less controversial principle such as [Con] ¬ ⊥ (which is a weak version of the Kantian principle that ought implies can). Unfortunately the answer is no, for given the bases R and S1 0 of these systems, any extension of these bases that has [Con] also provides [D] . Schotch and Jennings point out in [7] that the minimal deontic logic should preserve important deontic distinctions such as [D] and [Con] . If this is correct, then the systems formed by adding [Con] to R or S1 0 would not be the minimal deontic logic we are looking for. What that logic is must remain an open question.
